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Policy Brief #1: State SCHIP Design and The 





This Policy Brief1 is the first in a series of reports examining the design of state SCHIP 
programs as they near full implementation status. It explores, whether states in their enabling 
legislation establishing separate SCHIP programs confer upon eligible children an individual 
legal right to health insurance benefits (i.e., an individual entitlement) under state law, similar to 
the entitlement that Medicaid eligible children enjoy under federal law.  The question of 
whether states guarantee necessary health coverage for low-income children through the 
creation of an individual entitlement is fundamental to the study of state policy making under 
SCHIP.2 
As of the fall of 2000, 
■ Among the 34 separate SCHIP programs, none created an individual entitlement 
to SCHIP coverage as a matter of state law. 
■ Among the 34 states with separate SCHIP programs, 33 enacted separate 
legislation that can be analyzed (Oregon’s expansions were authorized by the state 
under its existing §1115 demonstration program).  Of these 33 states, 9 laws 
appear to mandate expenditures for eligible children up to fixed, authorized 
funding levels. This approach could be expected to be interpreted by courts as 
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requiring a state to provide SCHIP benefits to individual eligible children up to 
specified levels of state funding (“a restricted right to coverage”).  
■ In the remaining 24 states, the enabling legislation authorizing the state’s program 
either expressly or by implication does not provide any legal right to coverage.   
Two-thirds of the laws (16 states) explicitly state that nothing in state law should 
be deemed to create an entitlement; the remaining one-third (eight states) use 
legislative language that is so broadly drafted that under standard judicial 
principles, the legislative language used probably would not support a claim of a 
right to coverage, either through an individual entitlement or a restricted right to 
coverage, even where the state has funds available for coverage. 
The findings from this study are important in understanding state policy choices and priorities 
in the context of health coverage for low-income children. They suggest that when given the 
option, states tend to avoid the creation of a legally enforceable right in the case of pediatric 
health coverage. Even where, as in the enactment of SCHIP, Congress indicates a willingness 
to support the continued guaranteed right to coverage among children by giving states an 
option to use their SCHIP funds to do so, most states elected an alternative to the traditional 
Medicaid approach of open-ended entitlement. Furthermore, only a minority of states with 
separate SCHIP programs appear willing to authorize spending on children under what could 
be characterized as a capped entitlement, thereby guaranteeing eligible children a right to 
coverage up to authorized spending levels. Most states with separate programs appear to have 
retained discretionary control over the actual level of expenditures they might be required to 
undertake during a year, regardless of authorized state funding levels or the fact that the federal 
government has guaranteed a specified financial allotment to the states.  In these states 
enrollment could be frozen legally, despite the fact that funds remain available for coverage of 
eligible children.  
If low-income children are to be guaranteed health coverage as a matter of law, this study 
indicates that such an entitlement necessarily would arise from the existence of a mandatory 
federal individual entitlement rather than from separate state decisions to entitle low-income 
















This Policy Brief is part of a multi-year study designed to explore “separate” SCHIP programs 
(i.e., programs that operate under the separate statutory authority of the federal SCHIP statute 
rather than as part of an expanded state Medicaid plan).3   The study will examine the nature of 
the assistance conferred by states under separate programs, as well as questions of coverage 
and service delivery, including eligibility standards, the use of managed care arrangements, and 
benefit design.   
The larger study of which this Policy Brief is a part has two purposes.  The first is to assess 
how states use their devolutionary authority under the federal SCHIP legislation to structure 
new approaches to children’s health coverage and to assess the extent to which these new 
structures resemble or depart from traditional Medicaid design principles. The second is to 
consider the implications of separate SCHIP program design choices for children with special 
health needs (i.e., children with significant activity limitations whose health costs can be 
expected to exceed pediatric norms).  
 This Policy Brief examines whether in establishing separate SCHIP programs, states in their 
enabling legislation elect to give eligible children a legal right (i.e., a legal entitlement) to SCHIP 
benefits.  The right to coverage is perhaps the most fundamental hallmark of Medicaid 
program design and thus offers a logical “jumping off” point for this Policy Brief series. 
Background  
The threshold question in the design of publicly funded health coverage is whether the 
program will provide an individual entitlement to benefits.  Where a policy decision is to 
guarantee the receipt of benefits among eligible individuals, such a decision is commonly 
referred to as conferring a “legal right” to the assistance.  The means for achieving this policy 
goal is the creation of an individual legal entitlement.  
In the area of federal health policy, individual entitlements can be found in the federal tax laws 
that create health care-related tax benefits (such as the right not to be taxed on employer 
contributions to health insurance no matter how large). They also exist within the federal 
Medicare and Medicaid programs. States similarly have the authority to establish legal 
entitlements to direct or tax-funded benefits consistent with the constraints of their own 
constitutions, even though the federal government may not elect to do so.  
An individual entitlement guarantees that a benefit will be available for eligible persons who 
need it and qualify for it.  In the case of Medicare and Medicaid, this means that as a matter of 
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federal law, coverage must be furnished to persons who meet program eligibility criteria and 
cannot be arbitrarily denied, reduced or terminated.  As a result, an individual entitlement 
carries a number of important implications.    
From a budgetary standpoint, an individual entitlement most typically has no fixed upper limits 
on authorized spending; consequently, assistance (whether tax subsidies or direct expenditures) 
will be available at whatever level is necessary to carry out the purpose of the program.  The 
effect of such a guarantee of assistance is to override any upper limits on program spending 
that a legislature might have (at least preliminarily) contemplated for the program.   An 
entitlement also can be restrictive if it includes a fixed upper limit on total authorized spending.  
In a “restricted right to coverage” situation, a legal right to benefits would exist up to the 
authorized amount.  Expenditures for eligible persons would continue up to the full 
authorized program level.4  
Individual entitlements also have legal consequences.  Historically, courts have permitted 
beneficiaries of individual entitlements the right to bring private legal actions to enforce their 
rights.  In some cases (such as Medicare) the legal right to enforce the entitlement is spelled 
out directly in the statute.5 In other cases (e.g., insurance contracts written under state law, 
Medicaid coverage), courts will “imply” a right of legal action from the very existence of a clear 
right to the benefits itself.6 In the case of individual entitlements (i.e., entitlements with no 
fixed upper limits), courts have ordered the provision of assistance up to legally required levels, 
regardless of whether such a level of assistance would exceed estimated expenditure program 
limits.7  In the case of a restricted right to coverage, the obligation to extend benefits to an 
individual would exist up to the authorized spending level. 
 As a result of the ability of eligible individuals to enforce their legal right to benefits, 
entitlement-related spending tends to rise automatically as claims against the guarantee are 
made. Lawmakers can reduce or eliminate individual entitlements only by legislatively altering 
the terms of the entitlement itself.  The most recent example of this type of alteration was the 
1996 repeal of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which 
operated as both a state and individual legal entitlement, and its replacement with the 
                                                 
4 Vanderbilt Hospital v. Newsom, 653 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981). 
5  §205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g); Sec. 1812 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395d. 
6  Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (federal Medicaid law creates a legally enforceable 
right to reasonable hospital payments). Contrast Suter v Artist M, 503 U.S. 347 (1992) (federal child welfare laws 
create no legally enforceable right to a reasonable level of child welfare services).  
7 See, e.g., Alabama Nursing Home Association v. Harris, 617 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1980), which has been relied on by 
virtually all of the federal courts that ever have considered the issue of whether legislatively set expenditure 














Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, which entitles states (up to a 
specified limit) but not individuals, to assistance.8 
The SCHIP statute, like TANF, entitles states to payments up to a specified authorized level. 
At the same time, the statute explicitly does not create an individual entitlement in eligible 
children.9 The statute expressly provides that “nothing in this title shall be construed as 
providing an individual with an entitlement to child health assistance under a state child health 
plan.”10 SCHIP programs administered under the federal SCHIP statute thus contain no 
federal individual entitlement. 
Unlike TANF however, the federal SCHIP statute gives states discretion in certain critical 
choices where the issue of a federal entitlement is concerned.  Under SCHIP, a state may, at its 
discretion, use its federal allotment (either in whole or in part) to expand Medicaid, thereby 
extending a federal individual entitlement to coverage to additional eligible children. 
Alternatively, a state can establish a “separate” program that operates directly under the 
authority of the SCHIP statute itself and thus outside of the reach of federal entitlement law.  
In the case of states that choose to establish separate programs either in whole or in part,  
there are  further choices that bear on the issue of entitlements. As a matter of state law, a state 
could elect to establish its separate program as an individual entitlement; alternatively, a state 
might structure its program to create a restricted legal right to coverage (i.e., an entitlement up 
to authorized funding levels).  A third option would be to legislate a program that establishes 
neither an individual entitlement nor a restricted right to coverage but instead retains discretion 
on the part of state officials to not expend all authorized funds and defer coverage for eligible 
children, even where funding technically remains available.  
It might seem self-evident that separate state SCHIP programs never would operate as legal 
entitlements since states wishing to take this approach would instead use their allotments 
simply to expand Medicaid.  However, this assumption overlooks other compelling reasons 
why a state might elect to operate a separate program.  A state might create a separate program 
in order to be able modify the existing Medicaid benefit package or to use different eligibility 
or cost sharing rules from those found in Medicaid.  States that maintain separate programs 
still might wish to confer a legal right to coverage among all eligible children or alternatively, to 
confer a legal right to coverage up to authorized spending levels (i.e., a restricted right to 
coverage). For these reasons, the existence of a separate SCHIP program should not be 
equated as a policy matter with the absence of any right to coverage, even though adoption of 
a separate program does mean the absence of an individual entitlement under federal law.  As a 
result, the question of whether states elect to create health entitlements for children is a 
                                                 
8 Changing the eligibility age for Social Security benefits from 65 to 67 and a half, effective 2022, also provides 
an example of changing the terms of an entitlement, though Social Security remains an uncapped entitlement 
for those who meet the revised eligibility criteria. See §216(1)(1) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1). 
9 Sara Rosenbaum, et al.., “The Children’s Hour: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program,” Health 
Affairs, January/February 1998. 














research question that exists apart from other questions related to the structure of separate 
programs.  
Methods 
In this nationwide, point-in-time study, researchers collected and analyzed state legislation  
creating separate SCHIP programs.  Data collection and analysis took place during the summer 
and fall of 2000 and included analysis of both enabling legislation as well as relevant, separate 
legislation appropriating state funds.11 Lawyers experienced in welfare law and legislative 
analysis then created a legal entitlement typology against which to measure the state statutes.  
Under this typology, each state’s legislation reviewed was classified into one of four possible 
categories:   
1. Express individual entitlement: the legislation explicitly creates an entitlement. 
2. Implied entitlement: the legislation is silent on entitlement intent, but based on 
welfare case law and legal theory, can be characterized as having been drafted in an 
entitlement fashion (e.g., the legislation describes categories of children eligible to 
receive assistance; in addition, it may authorize the expenditure of funds on a “such 
sums as may be necessary” or “within available appropriations” basis). 
3. Express non-entitlement: the legislation expressly states that the benefits are not to 
be considered an entitlement. 
4. Implied non-entitlement: the legislation is silent on the entitlement but, based on 
prior welfare case law, can be construed as failing to create a legal entitlement.  In 
such a case, the legislation might consist simply of an annual appropriation to an 
agency to administer a program. Alternatively, the legislation might fail to include 
either a specific description of children to be assisted or legislative language 
authorizing the expenditure of such sums as are necessary to aid eligible individuals 
either on an open-ended basis or up to an aggregate cap. 
Where a legal entitlement was expressed or implied, lawyers further analyzed the legislation to 
determine whether the program operated as an individual entitlement or a restricted right to 
coverage. 
 
                                                 
11 Federal lawmakers tend to draft detailed authorizing and appropriations statutes.  The limited staff and 
legislative sessions in state capitols frequently can mean that statutory language creating a program is minimal, 
with some additional language contained in appropriations legislation. The details of a program may be left to 















The results are displayed on Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 shows that as of the fall of 2000, thirty-
four states elected to establish a separate SCHIP program, either alone or as part of a “hybrid” 
program that combined both a Medicaid expansion for the poorest children (e.g., increasing 
Medicaid income eligibility for all children ages 6 to 19 to 100% of the federal poverty level)12 
with a separate SCHIP program for less poor children.13 Table 1 shows the basic coverage 
structure and current status of state SCHIP programs.   
Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis conducted under the 4-pronged typology 
(express entitlement, implied entitlement, express non-entitlement, implied non-entitlement). 
Among the 34 states with separate SCHIP programs, thirty-three operated their programs 
pursuant to separately enacted state legislation (enabling legislation and/or appropriations 
legislation).14 An analysis of these 33 state laws revealed the following: 
None of the separate program laws appears to create an individual entitlement to coverage for 
eligible children as a matter of state law.  This finding probably is not surprising.  Were a state 
to entitle children to coverage on an open-ended financing basis, one would expect the state to 
adopt a simple Medicaid expansion.  Even if a state wanted to extend to near-poor children a 
more limited Medicaid benefit package or employ greater cost-sharing requirements, the more 
practical financing approach might be an expansion of Medicaid and an accompanying 
proposal to HHS to alter benefit and cost-sharing rules for the expansion population, as 
several states have done under §1115 of the Social Security Act.15  
Among the 33 states whose separate programs are accompanied by legislation,  researchers 
concluded that nine states laws could be characterized as creating restricted rights to coverage, 
since the language used to codify the program creates defined eligibility criteria from which 
mandatory spending up to available funding levels might be inferred.   Some of these state laws 
authorize spending and enrollment up to the level of combined state and federal 
appropriations.16 Alternatively, some states express an intent to cover as many children as 
possible (Maine) or anticipate enrollment up to the level of appropriations (Wyoming). This 
spending mandate could support a legal interpretation under traditional judicial principles that 
the legislation creates a restricted right to coverage among eligible children to receive coverage, 
                                                 
12 Coverage of all children ages 6 to 19 with family incomes at or below 100% of the federal poverty level is not 
mandatory until 2002.  §1902(a)(10)(a)(1)(i) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10(A)(i).  A number 
of state hybrid programs combine a “speed-up” of this phase-in date with a separate SCHIP program.  
13 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia elected to spend their SCHIP allotments entirely through a 
Medicaid expansion, thereby providing a federal individual entitlement to those individuals covered by the 
expansion. 
14 Oregon added its program through a modification of its §1115 demonstration and did not enact new 
legislation. 
15 For example, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Oregon operate expanded and modified Medicaid 
programs. 















but only as long as specified appropriations are available.  Furthermore, none of these nine 
state laws prohibits an individual action to enforce the right to coverage.  Therefore, in these 
states it might be possible for courts to infer the existence of an individually enforceable right 
under state law, depending on the judicial policy of a state regarding the ability to privately 
enforce rights even in the absence of an express right of action.  
Several of the nine state entitlement laws are quite explicit in requiring the administrative 
agencies to project likely enrollment, create enrollment priorities among eligible children, and 
provide for queuing in the event enrollment approaches the limits of funding to support it.17  
These contingency provisions clearly illustrate the restricted nature of the right created, while 
reflecting an intent to provide coverage to the limit of available funding.  In some of these 
states, the commitment to mandatory spending on behalf of children is limited through 
language (common in many state laws enacted pursuant to federal grant in aid programs) 
providing for the automatic elimination or reduction in the program in the event that federal 
financial participation declines or ends.18  
Among the remaining 24 states with separate laws, the legislation either expressly or by 
implication refutes any inference regarding the existence of any individual legal entitlement to 
coverage.  In a number of instances the legislation specifies that the law creates no enforceable 
right to coverage.    
Among the 24 states,19 sixteen explicitly state that no right to coverage exists, while eight use 
the type of language that under traditional judicial principles probably would be considered too 
broad and generalized to sustain an argument of entitlement.  For example, certain states use 
language that vests broad discretion in the administering agency to make expenditures from 
appropriated amounts, rather than directing the agency to expend funds on eligible children up 
to authorized levels.  Not surprisingly, the legislative language used by state legislatures to 
create their programs and achieve legislative intent varies significantly, an expected result given 
the differences in state legislative drafting practices and customs.  Three states did not enact 
specific enabling legislation.  Rather, they rely on the appropriations process to provide or 
authorize appropriations to executive departments whose authority to develop child health 
insurance programs predates SCHIP.  Alternatively, the legislature simply authorized an 
executive agency to develop and submit a state SCHIP plan to HCFA.  
 
                                                 
17 Many of the states that explicitly deny an individual entitlement also include similar contingent provisions 
that anticipate enrollment up to the level of appropriations.  See, e.g. Florida, Georgia, Colorado. 
18 See e.g, Montana and New York. 
19 These states include Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, 















The findings from this study are important in understanding state policy choices and priorities 
as reflected in permanent state enabling legislation regarding health coverage for low-income 
children. They suggest that when given the option, states tend to avoid the creation of a right 
to public pediatric health coverage. Even where, as in the enactment of SCHIP, Congress 
indicates a willingness to support the continued guaranteed right to coverage among children 
by giving states an option to use their SCHIP funds to do so, most states opt in whole or in 
part for an alternative to the traditional Medicaid approach of granting an individual 
entitlement.  Only 16 states elected to use their SCHIP allotments exclusively to fund Medicaid 
expansions that would extend a federal individual entitlement backed by open-ended federal 
funding to eligible children.  Of the 33 states studied with separate SCHIP programs, none 
grant an individual entitlement and only nine extend a restricted right to coverage.  Most states 
with separate programs appear to have retained discretionary control over the actual level of 
expenditures they might be required to undertake during a year, regardless of authorized 
funding levels or the guarantee of federal allotments.  In these states enrollment could be 
frozen legally, despite the fact that funds remain available for coverage of eligible children.  
We assume that states make these types of policy decisions for several important reasons.  
First, in expressly stating that states could elect between an entitlement and a non-entitlement 
approach, Congress indicated its willingness to extend federal financial assistance to states in 
the case of health coverage for near-poor children on a non-entitlement basis, at the election 
of a state. The fact that so many states elected to avoid an individual entitlement is consistent 
with Congress’ own signals on this matter.  
 Congress’ willingness to permit states to make this election in the case of near-poor children 
does not mean of course that Congress would not provide additional funding.  Were federal 
SCHIP funds to fall far short of need (i.e., were waiting lists to spring up throughout the 
country), Congress could respond by increasing state allotments. But the non-entitlement 
structure of the program allows Congress to make a deliberate choice with respect to children 
under separate SCHIP programs rather than have spending rise automatically in relation to 
need.   It is inevitable that most states would follow suit in their own legislative adoption of 
SCHIP.  Indeed, the states that established individual entitlements did so only through 
Medicaid expansions that brought with them the guarantee of open-ended federal matching 
funds. 
Another important dimension of the underlying policy in the case of SCHIP is Congress’ 
rejection of even a restricted right to coverage among near-poor children. Under federal law, 
states are entitled to an aggregate amount of federal funding, but children are not entitled to 
coverage up to the cap.  Again, it should not be surprising that in the face of Congressional 
unwillingness to pursue even a restricted right to coverage, so few states appeared to do so. 
Where Congress expresses its opposition to entitlements in such a strong fashion (i.e., by 
specifying the absence of entitlement in the statute itself and by capping the amount of money 














though the legislation gives states the option of applying their funds toward a Medicaid 
expansion.  Discussions with state officials and advocates suggest anecdotally that many of the 
same concerns that were evident in Congress – the financial exposure, ideological concerns, 
and a real concern over employer crowd out, all played a role in the state deliberative process 
that went into the creation of SCHIP.  
  In 1996 Congress seriously debated, and came close to enacting, a Medicaid block grant that 
would have transformed Medicaid from an individual entitlement program to a program of 
capped allotments to states, similar to the structure of SCHIP. The results of this study suggest 
that were Congress to revisit this approach, states could be expected to emulate Congress’ 
choices and implement the resulting program as a non-entitlement.  Such a result would mean 
a repudiation of Medicaid’s current guarantee of a right to coverage.  During good economic 
times with full employment and relatively high access to employer coverage,20 offering public 
health insurance on a non-individual entitlement basis may be feasible and might not leave a 
large number of eligible children and adults without assistance.  Even so, recent studies have 
shown consistently high levels of under-enrollment of eligible persons.21 As the economy 
begins to slow and signs of worker layoffs increase, the potential for the need for subsidized 
pediatric health insurance also grows, and state programs may begin to face stronger pressures.  
The findings in this analysis might be limited to state policy decision-making in the case of the 
near-poor children who qualify for coverage under separate SCHIP programs but who are not 
poor enough to qualify for Medicaid.  However, it is likely that states’ desire for greater 
discretionary controls over spending on child health would be even stronger in cases in which 
the target of aid is not children of the “working poor” but the poorest children, whose claim 
of a right to assistance might be the least politically strong. 
This analysis indicates that if low-income children are to be guaranteed health coverage as a 
matter of law, such an entitlement necessarily would flow from the existence of a mandatory 
open-ended federal entitlement rather than from separate state decisions. The findings here 
suggest that the decision to create a right to health care coverage must flow from a national 
commitment to do so. 
A key area for further study is how a state’s decisions regarding entitlements or restricted rights 
to coverage affect the overall administration of separate SCHIP programs.  For example, the 
                                                 
20 How good access to employer-sponsored coverage is for lower income workers even in boom times appears 
to be in doubt.   Among lower income workers earning $7 per hour or less, only 42% have insurance coverage. 
A study of low wage workers and employer-sponsored health benefits suggests that the majority of those 
without coverage work for employers that do not offer any and the remainder cannot afford the plans that they 
are offered.  Ellen O’Brien and Judith Feder, Employment-Based Health Insurance Coverage and Its Decline: The 
Growing Plight of Low-Wage Workers, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, May, 1999. 
21 Lynda Flowers and Trish Riley, “An Analysis of Policy Issues in S-CHIP and Medicaid Implementation,” 
National Academy for State Health Policy, August 2000; Robert Pear, “Forty States Forfeit Health Care Funds 
For Poor Children, The New York Times, September 24, 2000; State Health Monitor, “Majority of States Have 
Failed to Spend First-Year SCHIP Money, October 1, 2000; and Marilyn R. Ellwood and Leighton.Ku, 














decision to mandate coverage, even only up to authorized limits, might lead states to offer 
fewer benefits, impose higher cost sharing, or pay providers at a lower rate as techniques for 
controlling outlays.  The absence of a legal entitlement or a restricted right to coverage might 
also affect the existence of waiting lists for coverage.  The absence of a legal entitlement or 
restricted right to coverage might affect participation in the program among providers 
concerned with the cessation or deferral of benefits for eligible children. Finally, the true 
effects of state decisions regarding the entitlement status of their programs may be visible only 
when economic conditions cause states to halt or slow spending that they otherwise would 
make in a full or limited entitlement situation.  Thus, fully understanding the effects of state 
entitlement decisionmaking requires further research and monitoring over time.  
